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Human–computer interactionThe way information is presented inﬂuences human decision making and is consequently highly relevant to
electronically supported negotiations. The present study analyzes in a controlled laboratory experiment how
information presentation in three alternative formats (table, history graph and dance graph) inﬂuences the
negotiators' behavior and negotiation outcomes. The results show that graphical information presentation
supports integrative behavior and the use of non-compensatory strategies. Furthermore, information about
the opponents' preferences increases the quality of outcomes but decreases post-negotiation satisfaction of
negotiators. The implications for system designers are discussed.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Managers spend up to one ﬁfth of their working time with conﬂict
resolution and negotiation [15,63]. They increasingly negotiate via
electronic media such as e-mail, e-meeting and e-negotiation systems
[73]. Electronic negotiations are not mere translations of traditional
negotiations onto electronic media, but rather they provide additional
value by supporting the decision making and/or communication pro-
cess [62,74]. Electronic negotiation support (eNS) is realized through
information and communication technology and can range from a
simple message exchange to a complex support system. A negotiation
support system (NSS) comprises one or more of the following
functionalities: facilitation of communication, decision/negotiation
analysis support, process organization and structuring, and access to
information, negotiation knowledge, experts, mediators or facilitators
[26]. In this context, the representation of information (textual,
graphical, and auditory) is important for human–computer interac-
tions. Due to technical advances in the last decades, users can often
rapidly and effectively choose from various formats of computer
generated reports. We know from empirical evidence that the way
information is presented strongly inﬂuences human perceptions,
preferences and decision making (e.g. [5,76]). Thus, the presentation
of information is of essential importance for decision makers [70,77].x: +43 1 58801 33092.
Gettinger).
-ND license.Current technological advances allow decision makers to access
information more easily by using wireless networks, data warehouses
and similar tools [42,52]. The vast amount of information is not
necessarily linked to more accurate and efﬁcient decisions, but rather
sometimes to “information overload” for a decision maker (e.g.
[41,72]). Scientiﬁc interest also focuses on handling large amounts
of information and on overcoming mental resource limitations and
cognitive biases (e.g. [23,46]). These developments have led to the
advancement of stylized decision aids that “represent the problem
in a stylized way that capitalizes on some special human cognitive
processing ability” [86, p. 46]. Traditional stylized decision aids are
tables and graphs in the form of lines, scatter plots, bar charts, and
animations [45]. These display formats have been used successfully
to extend human processing abilities in decision making [34,78,79].
Nevertheless, the potential of stylized decision aids has not yet fully
been explored in eNS research. Thus far, scholars have focused on
the improvement of tool-functionalities which aid bargainers in the
negotiation process (e.g. [11,37,53]). In that sense, graphical support
implemented in a system would be used to improve process and out-
come (e.g. [7,12,82]). In electronic negotiation systems, information
to be represented in a graphical manner would include message
threads, preferences and utility values [62].
Although information representation is relevant, it has received
little attention in negotiation research. Typically, information in e-
negotiation systems is presented in text or tabular format. Except for
the suggested utilization of the “negotiation dance graph” [56], to date
only a “history graph” has been proposed and implemented [27,63]. A
history graph exhibits the history of offers and counteroffers over
162 J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174time of both negotiators based on preferences of the supported user
only. In contrast, the negotiation dance graph represents all offers and
counteroffers in the utility of both negotiators, while time is only im-
plicitly considered, and it provides users with information about the ac-
tual preferences of their counterparts.
The present study aims to analyze how information presentation in
these alternative formats (table, history graph and dance graph)
inﬂuences the negotiators' behavior and negotiation outcomes. The
paper reports on a 2006 controlled laboratory experiment. Students
from three universities in Europe and the Middle East negotiated a
contract in a scenario with multiple issues in the tourism industry.
Using the NSS Negoisst [62,63], subjects were divided into three treat-
ment groups using the three different representation aids on the nego-
tiation process: a table, a negotiation history graph or a negotiation
dance graph.
The paper is structured as follows: a discussion of the cognitive ﬁt
and related theories serving as the theoretical background of this
study; an introduction of different types of information representation
in a NSS; a discussion of the hypotheses comparing the effect of the
three different information representation aids on negotiation
processes and outcomes, based on previous empirical ﬁndings; a pre-
sentation of the Negoisst system and description of the experimental
setting; and a presentation and discussion of the results and limitations
of our study and future research threads.
2. Theoretical background
The paradigm of cognitive ﬁt suggests that effective and efﬁcient
problem solving is obtained when all tools or aids used in the problem
solving process correspond to the requirements of the task [78–80].
Problem solving is seen as an outcome of the relationship between
problem presentation and the problem solving task. Cognitive process-
es act on the information presentation and the problem-solving task to
provide a mental representation of the situation. The latter is the way
the problem is represented in human working memory. When the
types of information in the problem presentation match those in the
task, the problem solver formulates a mental representation that is
based on the same type of information. In contrast, amismatch between
the problem presentation and the task leads to a mental representation
based only on the problem representation. The decision maker must
then mentally transform the task into a suitable form, exerting addi-
tional cognitive efforts in order to solve a particular type of problem.
Similarly, if a mental representation is formulated according to the
task alone, the decisionmaker has to transform the data of the problem
presentation into an appropriate form for the task solution. In both
cases, additional cognitive capacities are required for auxiliary mental
steps, which typically lead to poor results for the decision maker. The
cognitive ﬁt theory encourages the use of problem representations
consistent with task requirements in order to improve the decision
making process for those using decision aids.
Complementing the cognitiveﬁt theory, Paivio [48–50] proposes the
dual coding theory. This suggests that human working memory en-
codes, organizes, stores and retrieves imagery and verbal information
in two different ways. When retrieving, processing and reproducing
information, cognitive activities are mediated by two independent yet
interconnected cognitive subsystems in the human mind: An imagery
system (specialized in the representation and processing of nonverbal
objects in a sequential manner) and a verbal system (specialized in
handling linguistic propositions using a parallel processing system).
Both methods are functionally interconnected at the referential levels,
so that an activity in one system can cause an activity in the other
system. The visual argument approach asserts that graphical displays
make less demands on human cognitive resources [34,59]. According
to this theory, graphs enable users to extract information without
engaging in deep processing by providing guidance, constraints and
facilitations in cognitive processes.The cognitive ﬁt theory and its complementary models (dual coding
theory, visual argument approach and conjoint retention hypothesis)
have received signiﬁcant attention in empirical research. Several stud-
ies conﬁrm the basic assumptions of the cognitive ﬁt theory and pro-
pose further extensions. Speier and Morris [71] provide a study
associating literature on graphical support and cognitive ﬁt theory.
They investigate the characteristics of query interfaces and show that
visual interfaces provide a holistic perspective of the presented data.
Along with Smelcer and Carmel [68], they extend the view of compara-
tive advantages of graphical display formats by showing that the perfor-
mance difference in terms of time and accuracy increases evenwith task
complexity. The relationship between the level of information
processing and environmental complexity has the shape of an inverted
“U” [65], demonstrating that graphical aids allow users to gather more
information prior to reaching the critical point of information overload.
Free cognitive resources can be used elsewhere. A more recent Speier
study [70] illustrates that subjects supported with graphs perform as
well as subjects supported with tables, when facing complex symbolic
tasks involving decision accuracy. Furthermore, they outperform the
latter when facing spatial tasks. Graphs help subjects ﬁnd solutions
faster regardless of task complexity in spatial tasks, while subjects
supported with tables are only equally efﬁcient in complex symbolic
tasks. Concerning the characteristics of spatial language, Hubona et al.
[21] provide support for the cognitive ﬁt theory in terms of decision
accuracy but not in terms of time. Recently, Khatri et al. [28] extended
the perspective of cognitive ﬁt for external problem presentations and
internal task representations. They ﬁnd subjects to perform more
accurately but not faster when both presentation formats match. The
ﬁt of both presentations facilitates an understanding of the presented
information.
Other studies suggest a trade-off between the beneﬁts ofminimizing
errors and the cognitive effort or time needed in a particular task envi-
ronment [14]. When facing complex situations, decision makers use
cognitive simpliﬁcation strategies [15,61] and pursue a strategy of
swapping effort in terms of time invested in the problem solution for
accuracy [24]. The graphical organization of information inﬂuences
the equation of this cost–beneﬁt tradeoff by allowing the user to pursue
an adequate strategymore easily than others. Jarvenpaa [22] introduces
the term “incongruence” to describe a situation inwhich the processing
required for a decision strategy and the process encouraged by the
graphical tool are in conﬂict. Thus, the cost–beneﬁt principle assumes
that this incongruence results in additional costs for the user, increased
effort or time or higher likelihood of mistakes. Dilla and Steibart [13]
conﬁrm that additional mental calculations increase the potential of
making mistakes.3. Types of information representation in eNS
In general, NSS have incorporated the following types of information
representation for quantitative data: (1) solely text-based systems,
(2) numerical systems offering analytical decision support with utility
functions and preference values, (3) systems offering stylized decision
aids in the form of tables, and (4) systems offering graphical display of
the negotiation history.
While text-based systems constitute a minimum requirement, all
other representation forms are more sophisticated. One idea to support
decisionmakers is to quantify all available data and to implement it into
numerical systems, which have already been shown to provide better
support than simple textual messages. Numerical systems require
well-structured inputs in a predeﬁned format [19], show impacts of
variables on results [7] and provide assessment scores [36]. However,
numerical systemsdonot support decisionmakers in handling dynamic
processes [7]. In negotiations, the history of exchanged offers, the
concessions of the negotiation parties over time, their possible change
of preferences and similar dynamic processes contain essential
1 Figs. 1, 2 and 3 are based on a generic negotiation example using the same case as
in the present study. They present the same information differing only in their imple-
mented presentation formats.
Fig. 1. Tabular Support for electronic negotiations.
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sentation is essential.
Tables represent information that is symbolic in nature. They pre-
sent data in separable formats, which introduce single point values
more accurately than other representation aids [12,31,67]. Results
from various studies indicate that tables should be used to present in-
formation when decision makers are required to recall speciﬁc
amounts, handle values accurately (e.g. [5,12,45]) or compare data
[44]. Therefore, in conﬂict situations with high sensitivity to small devi-
ations from the optimum, tabular reports can provide exact values that
aremore resistant to distortion in comparisonwith other forms of infor-
mation representation [4,5]. Tables provide little integrative informa-
tion. Any links between the single values displayed must be made by
the decisionmakers since tables neither provide support for integrating
the effects of a number of variables in one period of time, as schematic
faces do, nor for showing the effects of one variable over more periods
of time, as graphs do [67,79]. The general assumption is that symbolic
representation facilitates extracting and acting on discrete data values,
and analytical processes provide the most appropriate access for deci-
sion makers to data presented in tables [78–80].
As graphs can be displayed in various formats, they often differ
considerably in terms of their abstraction or arbitrariness. No unique
terminology has been used for characterization of graphs. They are
described as being “imaginastic,” which means that they convey
continuous information, while tables are seen as “verbal” in nature,
i.e. they convey discrete information [78,79]. Graphs have visuospa-
tial properties meaning they stress information on data relationship
rather than on linguistic intelligence [4,5]. Graphs facilitate the acqui-
sition of information by focusing on single units of information and
their characteristics. They also allow for the grouping of information
[35] and the establishment of associations among the values of each
information package (or variable) across time periods without
addressing the elements separately or analytically (e.g. [4,78,79]).
Graphical display formats have a sequential structure reﬂecting an
overview of the presented information. Many perceptual inferences,
including perceiving and drawing inferences, are automatically
supported at low cognitive costs [8,34]. Graphs facilitate the compre-
hension of large amounts of quantitative information [44,67]. Empir-
ical research has reported that subjects provided with graphical
formats are more effective in trend, pattern and time sequence datadetection, (e.g. [12,68,77]) and in task execution in terms of proces-
sing time (e.g. [31,32,44]).
Concerning the level of complexity, tables outperform graphs
regarding time and decision accuracy in simple decision making
settings [45,58]. At a low level of complexity, graphs are perceived to
be more difﬁcult to read than tabular displays [12]. An increase in task
complexity is better mediated by spatial rather than linear information
displays [68]. Studies suggest that graphical decision aids are more
efﬁcient and lead to better performance when subjects face a higher
cognitive load [45,58,70]. Graphs have been found to bemore appropri-
ate for the presentation of large amounts of information [12], because
users have to invest less effort in order to “get the message” shown in
graphical displays [5,6,40]. Users sometimes prefer graphs to tables
due to their appealing format; they enjoy exercises and experience a
higher level of satisfaction [40,43,77]. Still, subjects do not always prefer
the most appropriate presentation format for the relevant task [20,32].
The most common and straightforward way to provide users of
NSS with information about multi-issue offers is to present the utility
values [27]. This involves analyses of the current offer and all prior
offers made in the negotiation. Offers are evaluated and compared
to the negotiator's aspirations, reservation level or to the BATNA (Best
Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) over several periods of time,
while all social interactions are processed simultaneously [1,66].
The most common way to present a negotiator's utility is via tables.
Tables contain negotiators' utility in numerical form (see Fig. 1) and
allow for an easy interpretation of the presented information.1
One way to visualize the negotiation process graphically is the his-
tory graph (see Fig. 2), which has already been implemented in NSS
[63,64,82]. In the history graph, the factor “time” is represented on
the horizontal axis and negotiators' “utility” is on the vertical axis.
All offers are labeled on the ordinate according to the score associated
with an offer. Even though offers of both parties are displayed, the
calculation of the utility values is based only on the preferences of
the focal user. Therefore, the history graph shows the distance
between the offers submitted and received based on the focal users'
value function. The history graph is designed to enable users to assess
Fig. 3. The negotiation dance graph.Fig. 2. The history graph.
Table 1
Experiment design.
Design Information level
Own utility Own and counterpart utility
Format of
presentation
Table “Table group”
19 dyads
Not implemented and tested
Graphs “History graph group”
22 dyads
“Negotiation dance group”
19 dyads
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A and company B negotiate over a contract including several issues
and refer to the history graph. When company A formulates an
offer, the utility rating of the offer and consequently its graphical pre-
sentation is based on the preferences of company A. When company B
analyzes the offer received from company A, company B is provided
with a rating and a graphical display of the offer according to the rat-
ings of company B. This implies that each transmitted offer is rated
according to the focal user only, while the preferences of the counter-
part are not taken into account in the rating of offers or in the graph-
ical displays.
Alternatively, literature proposes the use of the negotiation dance
graph [56]. In contrast to the history graph, the negotiation dance
graph rates and visualizes each exchanged offer according to the
real preferences of both negotiators, i.e. the history of offers is pre-
sented in the joint utility space (see Fig. 3). The negotiation dance
graph presents preference information about the counterpart to the
negotiators, thus providing signiﬁcantly more information than the
negotiation history graph. Operatively, each offer is rated on the ordi-
nate according to the preferences of the focal negotiator, while on the
horizontal axis the offer is rated according to the preferences of the
counterpart. While in a single attribute negotiation, preference infor-
mation can directly be inferred from the dance graph, this informa-
tion is much more difﬁcult to read in a multi-attribute negotiation.
Nevertheless, by comparing several offers made by the negotiation
partner, the negotiators can identify the counterpart's major trade-
offs between attributes. Within an integrative negotiation approach,
the knowledge of the counterpart's true preferences facilitates
Pareto-improving negotiation moves and consequently efﬁcient
agreements [56]. Within a distributive negotiation setting, however,
it bears the danger of being exploited by opportunistic and competi-
tive negotiators. In the negotiation dance, the factor “time” is consid-
ered to be more implicit as all offers are numbered in chronological
order and linked by spatial lines. The main difference between the
history graph and the negotiation dance graph is that in the history
graph calculations are made only on the basis of the focal user's pref-
erences, whereas in the negotiation dance each rating is a function of
utilities of both users.The leading research question of this study is whether the three
alternative information presentation formats cause different process-
es and/or outcomes. Consequently we have to ask whether (1) the
presentation of information in different formats (table vs. graph)
and (2) the information level (own utility vs. own and counterpart
utility) affect the negotiation process and/or outcome (see also
Table 1). To do so, a sophisticated NSS is required offering all of the
functionalities.
3.1. The Negoisst system
To answer the research questions, an electronic negotiation sup-
port system is required that supports business negotiations, rich com-
munication support and various forms of decision support. Negoisst is
a web-based NSS offering sophisticated support and formal document
management [62,63]. Therefore, the experiments were conducted
using Negoisst (see Fig. 4 for a screenshot of the system). Users nego-
tiate via an electronic message exchange. The content of the messages
is written in natural language (shown to the left of Fig. 4). In order to
avoid misunderstandings and to prevent re-negotiations due to con-
tractual ambiguities, Negoisst offers semantic and pragmatic enrich-
ment. Semantic enrichment links free text to the negotiation agenda
(shown to the right of Fig. 4). Pragmatic enrichment supports explicit
intentions, because message types are indicated by the author (see
Fig. 4). Negoisst also provides decision support. Negotiators specify
their preferences on attributes to be negotiated and the system then
computes a utility function. Each offer is rated, and both negotiators
Fig. 4. The system interface of Negoisst.
165J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174can see in a glance how well they have already achieved their goals. If
a negotiator writes a message offering a certain package, then the sys-
tem will calculate the utility immediately. The negotiator can check
the utility value before sending the message. Negoisst automatically
deduces a contract version from each message sent, as well as a mes-
sage thread representing the reasons for the decisions taken. Users
are able to check the contract versions as well as all exchanged mes-
sages at any time during the negotiations.
For the purpose of this study, three different settings of varying
information presentation have been implemented. Subjects assigned
to the ﬁrst setting, also referred to as the “table group”, were provided
with a numerical display of utility values positioned next to the accord-
ing offer. When reviewing the ongoing negotiations, decision makers
could see changes in utility ratings in tabular form. Subjects in the
second setting were provided with the history graph in the negotiation
history. In order to avoid ambiguity in graphical display, a short expla-
nation of how to interpret calculated utilities is given to the users in
textual form next to the history graph. In the third setting, subjects
were provided with the negotiation dance graph, and a short written
description of its characteristics to avoid misinterpretation.4. Hypotheses
In this section, we suggest six hypotheses. Hypotheses 1–3 refer to
expected differences between presentation formats, and hypotheses
4–6 refer to expected differences between information levels.
Swaab et al. [75] propose that negotiators provided with graphical
decision aids develop a better understanding of the negotiation prob-
lem. Through the display of the utilities of previous offers andcounteroffers during the negotiation, negotiators can more easily
identify tendencies and trends, conﬂicting issues and topics less ex-
posed to conﬂict. Since negotiators refer to salient information [61],
we assume that negotiators with graph support will be more focused
on the task at hand, with knowledge of the entire process and the ability
to discuss issues in terms of utility values. Furthermore, negotiators
supported with graphs should be better able to create a shared cogni-
tion of the conﬂict situation and consequently facilitate communication
about needs and interests rather than positions (e.g. [43,61,75]). Addi-
tionally, graphs could also enhance the process of idea generation [7].
Altogether, we assume:
H 1(a). Negotiators supported with the history graph exchange more
priority information (i.e. information about interests and needs) than
those with tabular support.
Graphs offer a visualization of the relationship between negotiators
in terms of distance/closeness of offers and counteroffers and move-
ments toward or away fromeach other. Therefore, the relational aspects
are more salient to negotiators and will more often be addressed in dis-
cussions. The cognitive ﬁt theory suggests that graphs reduce cognitive
load. This should free resources for social relationship building. We,
therefore, hypothesize:
H 1(b). Negotiators supportedwith the history graph showmore social/
relational communication than those with tabular support.
Social interaction is closely related to the issue of fairness. It is as-
sumed that there are several reasons why people act in a fair manner
[9]. Apart from altruistic motives, people behave justly hoping for
166 J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174reciprocity from the other party or to avoid being punished for unfair
behavior (e.g. [54,87]). The dynamic representation of behavior in the
history graph makes both concessions and resistance to concede
visible for negotiation partners. We assume that this will evoke
more discussions about fairness:
H 1(c). Negotiators provided with a history graph will discuss fairness
more often than those with tabular support.
In any conﬂict situation, both parties have to converge in order to
reach an agreement, i.e. at least one has to make a concession. Conces-
sions seem to be crucial, especially when parties are trapped in a dead-
lock, or when conﬂict spirals occur and the situation escalates [29,55].
People often viewbargaining situations negatively and perceive conces-
sions as losses. Negotiators supported with the history graph can easily
assess the effects of concessionary steps since they are displayed
dynamically. We, therefore, hypothesize:
H 1(d). Negotiators provided with a history graph make more conces-
sions than those with tabular support.
Negotiators often base their decisions on heuristic strategies or on
oversimplifying rules, which allow them to generate leverage effects
within the decision accuracy-beneﬁt trade-offs [24]. This behavior
reduces cognitive effort and negative effect [18]. Negotiators trust
their own judgments to be correct. However, if conﬂicts become
more difﬁcult, the result is often overconﬁdence (e.g. [23,46]) and
less concessionary behavior from the involved parties [2]. To convince
or persuade the counterpart of a biased opinion, they use hard tactics
(threats, intimidation and demanding commitments) [69]. When
negotiators are provided with the negotiation history graph, the
risk to succumb to overconﬁdence is reduced. As discussed above,
negotiators can more easily analyze previous concession behavior
and infer how much effort is required to reach an agreement. We
hypothesize:
H 1(e). Negotiators provided with the history graph use fewer hard
tactics than those with tabular support.
In summary, negotiators provided with the history graph are
expected to share priority information and stress social relationships
and fairness. They will use fewer hard tactics and make more conces-
sions. In negotiation theory, this behavior is classiﬁed as “integrative
negotiation behavior” [84,85] and has been shown to have a positive
effect on agreement. We hypothesize:
H 2. Negotiators provided with the history graph are more likely to
reach an agreement than those with tabular support.
Whether an agreement is reached or not is an indicator of the
effectiveness of negotiations but not of the quality of negotiation out-
comes. In the negotiation theory, three further indicators are often
used to measure the quality of negotiation outcomes: joint outcome
(as an indicator for efﬁciency), contract balance (as an indicator for
fairness), and negotiator satisfaction with agreement (as a holistic
assessment) [16,33,57]. Empirical evidence proves that negotiators
pursuing an integrative negotiation strategy produce higher joint
outcomes (e.g. [10,83,85]). Furthermore, there exists a trade-off be-
tween time/effort and decision quality or accuracy [22,24]. The devel-
opment of value-creating offers, e.g. through logrolling, requires
signiﬁcantly more cognitive effort. This can be more easily achieved
when negotiators are supported with the history graph. Therefore,
we assume:
H 3(a). Negotiators provided with the history graph reach higher
joint outcomes compared to those with tabular support.Again, the importance of fairnesswill be stressedmore among nego-
tiatorswith history graph support.We, therefore, expectmore balanced
agreements in this group and hypothesize:
H 3(b). Negotiators provided with the history graph reach more bal-
anced (equal) agreements (measured in utilities) than thosewith tabu-
lar support.
Whennegotiations have closed andparties leave the virtual bargain-
ing table, they feel like either winners or losers [38]. Their mood and
feelings depend on various factors. The process by which agreement
was reached must be considered. The provision of the history graph
will lead to integrative negotiation behavior resulting in a better
bargaining climate [25]. According to the hypotheses stated above, we
expect higher joint and more balanced outcomes to have a positive im-
pact on the level of satisfaction (e.g. [17,37,77]). All of these factors con-
tribute to the following hypothesis:
H 3(c). Negotiators provided with the negotiation history graph
show a higher post-settlement satisfaction compared to those provid-
ed with tabular support.
In addition to the differences between tabular vs. graphical infor-
mation presentation, we aim to analyze the effect of the provision
of additional information in distinct graphs. The following hypotheses
concern the change of information in the settings. In contrast to the
history graph, the negotiation dance graph provides information
about the counterparts' utility.
We expect that this additional information will change negotia-
tion behavior in several ways. By providing utility information about
both negotiators, dyads should be better able to assess whether
their negotiation partner behaves fairly. Negotiators provided with
this type of graph can easily see if real concessions are being made.
Decision makers aware of this fact should consequently ask their op-
ponent for fair treatment and stress the importance of fairness more
often [47]. Therefore, we expect:
H 4(a). Negotiators providedwith a negotiation dance graphwill focus
more on fairness compared to negotiators provided with a history
graph.
In contrast to the history graph, the negotiation dance graph allows
negotiators to identify mutually beneﬁcial offers and counteroffers
more easily, because bargaining steps are exhibited in the joint utility
space. Furthermore, the visualization of offer-ratings according to the
preferences of both negotiators provides a certain extent of control to
both negotiation partners and, therefore, might actually act as a barrier
against deceiving the partner. We expect to see more concession mak-
ing, e.g. in the form of logrolling or Pareto-movements, andwe assume:
H 4(b). Subjects provided with a negotiation dance graphmake more
concessions compared to those provided with a history graph.
At the same time, additional information about the utility of the
counterpart and its representation in the utility space more explicitly
demonstrates the differences in positions resulting in an increased
awareness of conﬂict and/or unfair behavior. The higher level of con-
trol may actually induce negotiators to use more hard and soft tactics
for substantiating their own position while counterbalancing unfair
or competitive behavior. We, therefore, hypothesize:
H 4(c). Negotiators provided with a negotiation dance graph use
more hard tactics than those provided with the history graph.
In summary, we expect more discussion about fairness and con-
cession behavior when subjects are provided with utility information
Table 2
Subjects.
Austria Germany Israel Male Female Total
“Table group” 4 26 8 22 16 38
“History graph group” 15 25 4 21 23 44
“Negotiation dance group” 6 26 6 21 17 38
Total 25 77 18 64 56 120
2 Due to page constraints the questionnaire is not included, but can be requested
from the authors.
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assumption is that the positive and negative effects on negotiation
behavior will counterbalance each other with regard to the number
of agreements, and we hypothesize:
H 5. There are no differences in the number of agreements between
history graph and negotiation dance graph groups.
Although we do not expect differences in the number of agree-
ments between the two groups, we expect the quality of agreements
to differ signiﬁcantly. The visualization of changes in utilities due to
modiﬁcations in single issues in the negotiation dance graph helps
negotiators to identify Pareto movements and efﬁcient alternatives
[56]. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H 6(a). Negotiators provided with a negotiation dance graph reach
higher joint outcomes than those provided with the history graph.
We assume that the visibility of differences in utilities during the
negotiation process makes it more difﬁcult to demand “the bigger
share of the cake” [60]. There is an expectation of more balanced
agreements when negotiators have information about utilities of
both negotiation partners, and we hypothesize:
H 6(b). Negotiators provided with a negotiation dance graph reach
balanced agreements more often than negotiators provided with the
history graph.
Consequently, we expect negotiators who reach higher joint out-
comes and more balanced agreements will be more content (e.g.
[17,37,77]), and we hypothesize:
H 6(c). Negotiators provided with the negotiation dance graph will
be more satisﬁed with the agreement compared to negotiators pro-
vided with the history graph.
5. Method
To test the hypotheses we conducted a controlled laboratory exper-
iment. An electronic bilateral multi-issue negotiation in the tourism
industry was conducted using Negoisst in which we varied the type of
information representation between the three treatment groups
(table, history graph, negotiation dance graph).
5.1. Simulation case
The simulation case used for this analysis describes negotiations
between a European tour operator (Bingo Tours) and a Croatian
Hotel (Playa Hotel). Bingo Tours is a growing company interested in
adding Playa Hotel to its list of business partners. 14 issues need to
be discussed. The case was designed to constitute a mixed-motive
bargaining situation, including integrative and distributive issues.
Users were provided with private preference information, including
the importance of all issues and their reservation levels. Negotiators
were told that proﬁtable long-term partnerships with their counter-
parts were possible and desirable, although there was no speciﬁcation
of what a good deal should look like. No information was provided as
to whether other potential business partners would be interested in
either the tour operator or the hotel, so that subjects would assume
that there was no other potential partner (i.e. no alternatives).
120 undergraduate and graduate students of business administra-
tion and information systems of the Universities of Vienna (Austria),
Hohenheim (Germany) and Tel-Aviv (Israel) participated in this
study (see Table 2). The sample consists of 24 Austrian students, 75
German students, and 17 Israeli students. 56 participants are female
and 64 participants are male with an average age of 22.7 years. Bypairing subjects from different universities into dyads, the possible
distortion due to personal contact was minimized. Roles and treat-
ment were assigned randomly (see ﬂowchart of experimental process
in Appendix A). Students were not rewarded ﬁnancially for participa-
tion but received credits for courses at their university, independent
of the quality of their outcome. All participants received the same
two-hour preparation training. They had to ﬁll in a pre-negotiation
questionnaire giving user-speciﬁc information and expectations.2
Participants conducted the negotiations (which had to be completed
within 2 weeks) using Negoisst. Once the negotiation was terminated,
subjects answered a post-negotiation questionnaire.
5.2. Content analysis
We applied content analysis to the 60 negotiation transcripts
following the ﬁve stage model suggested by Srnka and Koeszegi [73].
Each negotiation transcript was unitized by two coders. At the end of
unitization, two quality checks were performed. When assessing inter-
coder reliability of unitization, we reached a Guetzkow's U=0.17% and
the textual conformance of unitization of 91.36% of all coded units. Both
results can be considered very satisfying [30,73,84]. Differing unitiza-
tions were eliminated through discussion. In total, the 60 negotiation
transcripts were divided into 10,161 codable units. For categorization,
a category scheme was developed including 64 subcategories summa-
rized in nine main categories (see Appendix A). Each negotiation tran-
script was coded by two coders. The inter-coder reliability, Cohen's κ,
reached 0.94 which can be considered an excellent result [39]. Again,
discrepancies between coders were discussed, and all differences
were eliminated.
6. Results
As mentioned, the 60 negotiation transcripts, containing 740 mes-
sages, included 10,161 communication units.
Considering the presented category scheme, categories including
concessions, the exchange of priority information and social emphasis
are all part of an integrative bargaining style. Categories of normative
statements, tactics, negative responses, positional information and
positional offers are elements of distributive bargaining behavior. Only
about one fourth of the total communication was used for cooperative
approaches, while half of the efforts represented competitive bargain-
ing behavior. The rest of the communication units, almost one fourth,
were needed to coordinate the bargaining process. Fig. 5 shows the
distribution of communication units in the main categories.
On average, subjects in all three groups used the same number of
communication units (table M=86.39, negotiation history graph
M=84.61, negotiation dance graph M=83.03). The proportion of
communication units for individual subjects in the three groups
differed signiﬁcantly. Table 3 lists the means and standard deviations
of the relative frequencies of main and subcategories of each individ-
ual negotiator used to test the hypotheses. Our analysis of the com-
munication patterns, i.e. hypotheses H 1(a–e) and H 4(a–c), is based
on comparisons of these relative frequencies in the three different
groups. For hypotheses concerning the agreement rate, the joint
Fig. 5. Distribution of communication units.
168 J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174utility, and the contract balance, i.e. hypotheses H 2, H 3(a–b), H 5,
and H 6(a–b), we referred to the data stored by the system Negoisst
in the negotiations. Hypotheses H 3(c) and H 6(c) are based on the
answers provided by the subjects after the negotiations. For these
comparisons, we used Kruskal–Wallis and Mann–Whitney tests,
since data was not distributed normally.Table 3
Relative frequencies of main and subcategories.
Main and subcategories
(relative frequencies and standard deviations)
Table
N=38
Mean SD
Make concession 13.40% 0.051
Concessions (other than lockout option) 9.00% 0.045
Concession lockout option 0.30% 0.005
Cond. concesions (other than lockout option) 1.30% 0.017
Cond. concession lockout option 0.30% 0.006
Acceptance 2.40% 0.024
Multi issue offer 0.10% 0.005
Ask or give priority information 4.72% 0.037
Request priority information 1.49% 0.025
Request product information 0.04% 0.003
Give priority information 1.33% 0.015
Reveal personal information 0.45% 0.007
Clariﬁcation 1.41% 0.022
Show social support 10.04% 0.052
Show concern or express understanding 1.77% 0.014
Show positive emotion (incl. thanking and humor) 5.04% 0.033
Express apology or regret 1.08% 0.012
Refer to trust and relationship 0.88% 0.012
Express hope 1.12% 0.015
Make off-task comments (extra role) 0.15% 0.005
Make positional offers 24.93% 0.076
Give positional information 11.97% 0.057
State facts about product/service/company 4.30% 0.031
Self-supporting statements 1.48% 0.013
Persuasive statements 6.18% 0.038
Show negative response 5.91% 0.028
Reject proposals, offers or suggestions 3.43% 0.020
Set conditions (not related to concrete issue) 0.98% 0.009
Show negative emotions or sarcasm 1.50% 0.018
Substantiate position 2.73% 0.021
Stress similarities and common ground 0.61% 0.009
Request understanding/accommodation 0.78% 0.009
Refer to fairness 1.34% 0.014
Use tactics 4.00% 0.024
Soft tactics 1.60% 0.016
Hard tactics 2.40% 0.017
Process coordination 22.37% 0.067
Total 100%In hypothesis H 1(a), we expect negotiators provided with a history
graph to exchange more information concerning the task at hand than
those provided with tables. Thus, we look at the main category “ask or
give priority information” including the subcategories “request priority
information,” “request product information,” “give priority informa-
tion,” “reveal personal information,” and “clariﬁcations.” The threeHistory graph
N=44
Negotiation dance graph
N=38
Total
Mean SD Mean SD
11.70% 0.062 13.40% 0.067 12.83%
8.00% 0.060 9.10% 0.059 8.70%
0.40% 0.006 0.91% 0.009 0.54%
1.20% 0.021 1.40% 0.022 1.30%
0.10% 0.003 0.06% 0.003 0.15%
1.90% 0.023 1.78% 0.018 2.03%
0.10% 0.004 0.10% 0.005 0.10%
5.06% 0.036 5.25% 0.039 5.01%
1.26% 0.017 1.24% 0.016 1.33%
0.19% 0.006 0.31% 0.008 0.18%
1.67% 0.018 1.72% 0.021 1.57%
0.95% 0.011 0.37% 0.021 0.59%
1.00% 0.010 1.62% 0.018 1.34%
12.49% 0.057 11.48% 0.045 11.34%
1.91% 0.022 1.86% 0.020 1.85%
5.38% 0.034 5.95% 0.032 5.46%
1.07% 0.016 0.83% 0.013 0.99%
1.80% 0.018 1.19% 0.014 1.29%
1.88% 0.016 1.34% 0.016 1.45%
0.41% 0.010 0.30% 0.005 0.29%
25.97% 0.077 27.25% 0.086 26.05%
9.93% 0.037 9.73% 0.057 10.54%
4.05% 0.029 3.38% 0.026 3.91%
1.26% 0.012 1.22% 0.013 1.32%
4.62% 0.026 5.14% 0.038 5.31%
4.92% 0.037 4.32% 0.033 5.05%
3.49% 0.033 2.72% 0.023 3.21%
0.64% 0.010 0.40% 0.008 0.67%
0.78% 0.013 1.21% 0.017 1.16%
3.20% 0.023 2.98% 0.030 2.97%
0.21% 0.004 0.49% 0.008 0.44%
1.13% 0.014 1.65% 0.017 1.19%
1.85% 0.015 0.84% 0.015 1.34%
2.36% 0.023 3.75% 0.026 3.37%
1.00% 0.012 1.70% 0.018 1.43%
1.40% 0.021 2.00% 0.018 1.93%
24.38% 0.064 21.83% 0.057 22.86%
100% 100% 100%
169J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174former subcategories represent the exchange of information about the
characteristics of issues at hand and the decision maker's preferences.
The subcategory “reveal personal information” focuses on personal
information of subjects and those having an impact on at least one
decision maker. Comments to clarify prior statements were considered
as an effort to decrease the likelihood of misunderstandings and to em-
phasize task relevant aspects. Analyses show no differences in the com-
munication about the task due to the type of information presentation
(p=.284 U=774.5). Thus, hypothesis H 1(a) is not supported.3
In hypothesis H 1(b), we predict that negotiators provided with a
history graph are more concernedwith social aspects of the negotiation
process than those provided with tables. In order to measure “social
orientation,” we examine the main category “show social support.”
This category includes subcategories that express empathic communi-
cation, positive emotion or reference to general social or personal
elements of negotiations, i.e. “show concern or express understanding,”
“showpositive emotion,” “express apology or regret,” “refer to trust and
relationship,” “express hope,” and “make off-task comments.” Our
results illustrate that negotiators provided with the history graph put
signiﬁcantlymore emphasis on these social aspects than those provided
with tabular support (p=.015 U=600.5). Moreover, negotiators
provided with the history graph display signiﬁcantly fewer negative
emotions and sarcastic remarks (see subcategory “show negative
emotion or sarcasm”) than those with tabular support (p=.014
U=613). Therefore, hypothesis H 1(b) is supported by our data.
According to hypothesis H 1(c), we expect subjects provided with
the history graph to discuss the issue of fairness more often than sub-
jects provided with a table. To test this hypothesis, we examine the
subcategory “refer to fairness.” As expected, we ﬁnd that negotiators
provided with a history graph put more emphasis on discussing
fairness issues than negotiators provided with a table (p=.048
U=658.5). Therefore, hypothesis H 1(c) is supported.
In H 1(d), we hypothesize that negotiators provided with a history
graph make more concessions than those provided with a table. When
comparing the median values of the main category “make concession,”
it is obvious that users supported with tables assent more often. We
tested this hypothesis in the opposite direction and ﬁnd weak support
(p=.060 U=669.0). However, we have also examined the issues for
which negotiators are prepared to make concessions. We look at how
these concessions are framed, i.e. as an unconditional concession (e.g.
“I am willing to offer a lower price”) or as a conditional concession
(e.g. “I am only offering a lower price when you increase the number
of rooms”). We observe an interesting difference which partly supports
our original hypothesis; when examining the most important and con-
ﬂicting issue of the negotiation case (the lock-out option), we ﬁnd that
users provided with the history graph more often make unconditional
concessions (p=.067 U=706.5), while users provided with tables
make signiﬁcantly more conditional concessions (p=.049 U=719.0).
With regard to hypothesis H 1(e), the analysis of the main category
“use tactics” shows that, supporting our hypothesis, subjects of the table
group use signiﬁcantly more tactics than subjects of the history
graph group (pb .001 U=481.0). Our analysis reveals that negotiators
supported by tables use signiﬁcantly more hard tactics (p=.001,
U=516.5) and slightly more soft tactics (p=.057 U=673.0).
In hypothesis H 2 we predict that negotiators provided with the
history graph are more likely to reach an agreement than negotiators
providedwith tables. To test this hypothesiswe compare the agreement
rate in the table and the history graph group andﬁndonlyweak support
for our hypotheses. Negotiators provided with the history graph reach
an agreement more often than negotiators provided with tables
(p=.080 χ2=2.730).
To test hypothesis H 3(a),we calculate the joint utility, i.e. the sumof
the utility of both negotiators within one dyad. The results do not3 We also tested the data for differences in the distribution of communication units
with regard to nationality of subjects but found no signiﬁcant differences.support our hypothesis. In contrast, the results show that subjects pro-
vided with a history graph reach outcomes with signiﬁcantly lower
joint utility than subjects provided with tables (p=.015 U=252.0).
Fairness, another indicator for the quality of agreements, is mea-
sured in this study through the contract balance, i.e. the difference be-
tween the utility reached by each negotiator within one dyad.
Contrary to our prediction in hypothesis H 3(b), the agreements of
users provided with the history graph are signiﬁcantly less fair com-
pared to agreements reached by negotiators provided with tables
(p=.002 U=204.0). Data from the post-negotiation questionnaire
show that subjects provided with the history graph perceived their
partners as well as themselves to be more satisﬁed with the negotia-
tion outcome than subjects provided with tables (p=.047
U=281.5), thus supporting hypothesis H 3(c).
The following results for hypotheses H 4–6were obtained from tests
between the two groups supported with graphs but provided with dif-
ferent levels of information. In hypothesis H 4(a), we assume that nego-
tiators providedwith the negotiation dance graph discuss fairnessmore
often than negotiators provided with the history graph. However, con-
trary to prediction, negotiators providedwith the history graph put sig-
niﬁcantly more emphasis on discussing fairness than negotiators
provided with the negotiation dance graph (pb .001 U=459.5).
In hypothesis H 4(b) we predict that negotiators provided with a
negotiation dance graph make more concessions compared to those
provided with a history graph. We do not ﬁnd a difference in overall
concession behavior. However, similarly to the results for H 1(b),
when looking at the most important and conﬂicting issue (lock out
option), we ﬁnd that users provided with the negotiation dance graph
make more unconditional concessions (p=.009 U=599.0). Therefore,
hypothesis H 4(b) is partially supported. We ﬁnd that negotiators
providedwith the negotiation dance graph use hard tactics signiﬁcantly
more often than negotiators provided with the history graph (p=.013
U=603.5). Moreover, negotiators of the dance graph group also use
signiﬁcantly more soft tactics than negotiators of the history graph
group (p=.044 U=660.0). Thus, hypothesis H 4(c) is conﬁrmed.
According to hypothesis H 5, we expect to ﬁnd no difference in the
number of agreements between the history graph and the negotiation
dance graph groups. The data supports this hypothesis and reveals no
difference between these two groups in terms of the agreement rate
(p=.595 χ2=0.438).
When comparing the quality of agreements, we ﬁnd that negotia-
tors provided with the negotiation dance graph reach signiﬁcantly
higher joint outcomes than negotiators provided with the history
graph (p=.019 U=308.0). Therefore, hypothesis H 6(a) is supported
by our data. Similarly, subjects of the negotiation dance graph group
reach more balanced agreements than subjects of the history graph
group (pb .001 U=220.0), thus supporting hypothesis H 6(b). In H
6(c), we hypothesize that negotiators provided with the negotiation
dance graph are more satisﬁed with the agreement compared to ne-
gotiators provided with the history graph. However, contrary to our
prediction, we ﬁnd that users of the history graph show signiﬁcantly
higher post-negotiation satisfaction than users of the negotiation
dance graph (p=.025 U=265.0).
7. Discussion
These results summarized in Table 4 clearly show that the presenta-
tion of information affects negotiation processes. Our data reveals over-
all that negotiators who have graphical support show more integrative
negotiation behavior compared to negotiators who have access to the
same information presented in tables. When negotiators are provided
with a graphical representation of the negotiation history, they show
more social support, express fewer negative emotions and talk more
about fairness. They use fewer hard and soft tactics and are more
often prepared to concedeunconditionallywhen it comes tohighly con-
ﬂicting issues. As a consequence, this more integrative behavior has
Table 4
Summary of results.
Treatment Dependent Hypothesis Results
Type of information presentation
(tables vs. history graph)
Negotiation process H 1(a) aNo difference in the exchange of priority information
H 1(b) Graphical support leads to more social support and less negative emotions
H 1(c) Graphical support leads to more discussions about fairness
H 1(d) Graphical support leads to slightly more unconditional and less conditional
concessions in the most important and conﬂicting issue
H 1(e) Graphical support leads to less use of hard and soft tactics
No. agreements H 2 Graphical support leads to slightly more agreements
Quality of outcome H 3(a) bGraphical support leads to lower joint utility
H 3(b) bGraphical support leads to more unbalanced agreements
H 3(c) Graphical support leads to a higher post-negotiation satisfaction
Information level (history graph
vs. negotiation dance graph)
Negotiation process H 4(a) bMore information leads to less discussions about fairness
H 4(b) More information leads to more unconditional concessions in the most important and
most conﬂicting issue
H 4(c) More information leads to an increased use of hard and soft tactics
No. agreements H 5 More information has no impact on the number of agreements
Quality of outcome H 6(a) More information leads to a higher joint utility
H 6(b) More information leads to more balanced agreements
H 6(c) bMore information leads to a lower post-negotiation satisfaction
a Hypothesis not conﬁrmed.
b Contrary to prediction.
170 J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174positive effects on negotiation outcomes: the history graph facilitates
reaching an agreement. Negotiators are also signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed
with the outcome when they have access to a graphical representation
of the negotiation history.
Contrary to our prediction is the ﬁnding that the quality of negotia-
tion outcomes, in terms of contract balance (fairness) and joint utility
(efﬁciency) is lower when negotiators are provided with the history
graph compared to those provided with tables. The results indicate
that negotiators provided with the history graph followed a non-
compensatory strategy. Usually, non-compensatory strategies are
used when decision makers face a vast amount of information and
balance a strategy's accuracy against its cognitive effort [3,24].
When comparing the effects of different information levels provided
by the two graphs, we ﬁnd that negotiation behavior becomes tougher.
If negotiators are provided with the utilities of their opponent, then the
visualization of offer-ratings according to the preferences of both nego-
tiators makes it impossible to outwit the counterpart. The high level of
control of both negotiation partners may actually act as a barrier to
deceive the partner. Therefore, negotiators use more hard and soft
tactics to substantiate their own position. At the same time, the negoti-
ation dance graphmay act as an ex-postmonitoring system.When users
make a concession, they can easily seewhether their counterparts recip-
rocate, and the dance graph reduces the risk of being exploited. We ob-
serve that negotiators provided with the negotiation dance graph offer
more unconditional concessions. The effect of these differences in be-
havior is visible in the quality of outcomes: in contrast to the history
graph, the negotiation dance graph facilitates efﬁcient and fair agree-
ments. Nevertheless, it does not make negotiators more satisﬁed. On
the contrary, their holistic assessment of the negotiation outcome is
signiﬁcantly lower compared to the negotiators who have no access to
utility values of their opponent. This canbe explained by the tougher ne-
gotiation process visible through the increased use of hard tactics and by
the fact that negotiators compare their individual outcome with the
opponent's outcome. Even a small difference in utilities might lead to
the feeling of being a loser instead of a winner (e.g. [17,37,77]).
In summary, there is no clear recommendation as to which graph
support should be implemented in negotiation systems. While the his-
tory graph facilitates integrative negotiation behavior and increases the
probability of agreements, it leads to less balanced and efﬁcient agree-
ments. The negotiation dance graph, on the other hand, facilitates efﬁ-
cient and fair agreements but at the same time, negotiators are less
satisﬁed with their achievements.
In general, these results also suggest that the implementation of
stylized decision aids needs to be analyzed in terms of their indirectimpact on qualitative/normative aspects of negotiation processes and
outcomes.While decisionmakers can often be supported in their search
for a correct solution (e.g. recognizing trends within data by overcom-
ing limited cognitive resources), this is not possible for negotiation
problems which inherently contain perceived or real conﬂicting inter-
ests of the participants. In such a situation, there is no “correct” or
“right” solution for the decision problem, and any support for the
decision maker has to follow other criteria of optimization. For system
designers two important factors of consideration are: identiﬁcation of
criteria which are relevant for effective negotiation support (e.g. fair-
ness, economic efﬁciency, effectiveness etc.); identiﬁcation of support
aids (graphical or non-graphical) which have an effect on process and
outcome.
Our study delivers interesting insights, but it faces some limitations.
The student sample limits the generalizability of our ﬁndings. However,
the use of students as subjects has become very common in negotiation
research and they can be seen as a sample of future managers dealing
with NSS in their upcoming careers. As subjects were not inﬂuenced
by the outcomes of negotiations, perhaps they were less motivated
than if they had been in real negotiations involving superiors. Further-
more, the data used in this study was retrieved from one single case,
which might restrict the generalization of our results. Additionally, it
is not known how differences in individual cognitive constraints or
cognitive load have inﬂuenced results. Moreover, subjects did not use
their native language, and different English skills might have had an
impact on the discussions. Another limitation of this study is that we
do not know how much the subjects referred to their information
presentation tools as decision support.
Several factors that could affect negotiation process/outcomes
were not investigated in this paper. First, several studies show that
the level of conﬂict in simulation cases inﬂuences results signiﬁcantly
[11,53]. Conﬂict could be induced by varying the discussion issues
and creating more integrative/conﬂicting bargaining settings. Users'
performance could be observed by changing only external factors
(in this case the bargaining situation in which negotiations are em-
bedded). Variance in the number of issues involved in a case could
also affect the end result. Another avenue of future research is the
effect of additional information provided to users. The present
study shows that the amount of information provided to negotiators
leads to either more cooperative or more competitive behavior. Fu-
ture studies should investigate the impact of different types of infor-
mation implemented in different information displays. Considering
the process of information gathering, future investigations also
need to examine the effect of dynamic decision aids at different
171J. Gettinger et al. / Decision Support Systems 53 (2012) 161–174stages of decision making. A particular focus should be placed on the
stages in which information is acquired and in which the informa-
tion is evaluated. The issue of time duration of the experiment
must be taken into account [51]. The effects of additional support
provided by graphical aids are often seen as a trade-off between
the beneﬁts of minimizing errors and the cognitive effort or time
needed in a particular task environment [22]. In the present study,
there was an imposed time deadline for all users, thus the variable
time was kept constant and all impacts could be considered only
with regard to proxies for the quality of decisions. Raiffa [56] argues
that a negotiation resembles a dance of negotiation partners. We have
demonstrated with this study that there is no straight answer to theMain categories Deﬁnition Sub categor
Create value 1 Make concession Substantive negotiation behavior that
constitutes a concession or an
agreement of parts of an offer or
agreement to an offer package.
1 Conces
room
2 Conces
room
3 Conces
enterta
4 Conces
5 Conces
6 Conces
7 Cond. c
double
8 Cond. c
double
9 Cond. c
(meals
10 Cond. c
11 cond. c
12 Cond. c
13 Accept
14 Multi i
2 Ask or give
priority
information
Statements requiring or providing
information about needs or interests
1 Reques
2 Reques
3 Give p
4 Reveal
5 Clariﬁc
3 Show social
support
Statements that constitute emphatic
communication or show positive
emotions.
1 Show c
2 Show p
3 Expres
4 Refer t
5 Expres
6 Make o
Claim value 4 Positional offer Substantive negotiation behavior that
constitute positional bargaining and
value claiming.
1 Positio
double
2 Positio
double
3 Positio
(mealsquestion “Shall we dance?” Rather the results suggest that the answer
depends on the partners' aims (efﬁciency vs. fairness) quantitative vs.
qualitative outcomes (utility vs. satisfaction), to dance or to skip the
dance.Acknowledgment
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A.1. The category schemeies Detailed description Examples
sion no. of single/double Make or offer a concession
(compared to own previous
offer)sion price of single/double
sion add. services (meals,
inm.)
sion lockout option
sion cost sharing
sion airport service
oncession no. of single/
room
Offer a conditional concession
(logrolling: if - then)
oncession price of single/
room
oncession add. services
, …)
oncession lockout option
oncession cost sharing
oncession airport service
ance
ssue offer
t priority information May I know what
your expectations are
about that?
t product information How many rooms do
you have?
riority information (attribute related preferences) The price of the rooms
is most important for
me.
personal information (other than attribute related) I had a very tough
meeting today and
now I am tired
ation If you look at your last
offer, you can see that
oncern or express understanding (empathic com.) I understand your
argument.
ositive emotion (incl. thanking and humor) It is a great pleasure
for me too.
s apology or regret I am very sorry about
that.
o trust and relationship For me a good
relationship is very
important.
s hope We hope that you
understand our
position.
ff-task comments (extra role) Can I have your
email?
nal offer no. of single/
room
Make initial offer or repeat a
previous offer/position (also if -
then)nal offer price of single/
room
nal offer add. services
, etc.)
(continued on next page)
Appendix A1 (continued)
Main categories Deﬁnition Sub categories Detailed description Examples
4 Positional offer lockout option
5 Positional offer cost sharing
6 Positional offer airport service
7 Bottomline offer no. of single/
double room
Offer a concession by using a
bottomline or threat
8 Bottomline offer price of single/
double room
9 Bottomline offer add. services
(meal,…)
10 Bottomline offer lockout option
11 Bottomline offer cost sharing
12 Bottomline offer airport service
13 Request concession no. single/
double room
Request concession
from the counterpart
14 Request concession price single/
double room
15 Request concession add. services
(meal, …)
16 Request concession lockout option
17 Request concession cost sharing
18 Request concession airport service
5 Give positional
information
Facts or statements intended to
persuade
1 State facts about product/service/company Our rooms have air-
conditioning.
2 Self-supporting statements We have the best
rooms in the City.
3 Persuasive statements Okay, I really like you
and I make you a very
special offer.
6 Show negative
response
Rejecting offers or showing negative
emotions
1 Reject proposals, offers or suggestions We cannot lower the
price.
2 Set conditions (not related to
concrete issue)
If you accept all this…
3 Show negative emotions or sarcasm … but I have to say, that
I'm really angry!…You
cannot be serious!
7 Use tactics and
contention
Communication that is intended to
inﬂuence the other party
1 Make commitments This is my very last
offer.
2 Exert pressure You have to decide
until tonight.
3 Make promises In the next contract,
we can offer you a
better price.
4 Suggest sequential issue negotiation We should discuss the
price ﬁrst.
5 Refer alternative suppliers/buyers We have a better offer
of a different
supplier!
6 Use authority related tactics My boss will be very
unhappy.
8 Substantiate
position
Normative statements to substantiate
own position
1 Stress similarities and common
ground (normative)
Our guests are also
your guests and
therefore …
2 Request understanding/accommodation
(normative)
Please understand
that we cannot go
below this price.
3 Refer to fairness (normative) This is a fair offer.
Process 9 Process variables Communication related to the
negotiation process or speciﬁc for
text-based, computer-mediated,
asynchronous communication
1 Time related or process oriented I cannot access
Internet over the
weekend.
2 System issues Do you understand
how this system
works?
3 Impersonal address, closing or signature Yours sincerely, Playa
Beach Resort
4 Personalized address, closing or signature I wish you a very nice
evening andall thebest,
Playa Beach Resort.
5 Text structuring my offer:, etc.
6 Redundant units and anomalies
A.2 The steps of the experiment
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